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Putting the Fox in Charge? Political Parties and
the GDPR: An Irish Perspective
Maeve MCDONAGH* & Mary DONNELLY*
In the wake of Cambridge Analytica, the use of personal data by political parties has been subject
to increased scrutiny. Given the specific policy challenges which such use poses, this article
examines the conditions for the lawful processing of personal data under the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR), as it applies to political parties. It identifies the extensive
flexibilities afforded by the GDPR to Member States and argues that granular Member State
analysis is required if the GDPR regime is to be meaningfully evaluated in this context. Using
Ireland as a detailed case study and referencing the equivalent provisions of the UK Data
Protection Act 2018 (DPA UK) for comparison, the article examines the different ways in
which these Member States responded to the flexibility afforded by the GDPR. Based on this,
the article argues that closer engagement with the issue of political parties by the European Data
Protection Board is needed in order to provide a more fine-grained response which bridges the
space between the ‘one size fits all’ approach in the GDPR and the wide-ranging discretion of
the flexibilities afforded to Member States.
Keywords: GDPR, political parties, lawful processing, freedom of expression, public interest,
European Data Protection Board
1 INTRODUCTION
Political parties have always collected personal data relating to their constituents
and potential voters, whether through traditional doorstep conversations involving
party canvassers or through political ‘clinics’. This information may include con-
stituents’ personal details, their likely voting habits, and the issues that concern
them and that could influence their voting behaviour.1 For many years, scant
attention was paid in data protection circles to the processing of personal data by
political parties.2 The situation changed utterly in early 2018 when the Cambridge
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1 In fact, the impact of information gathered in this way on the development of political policy is
unclear: see P. Öhberg & E. Naurin, Party-Constrained Political Responsiveness: A Survey Experiment on
Politician’s Response to Citizen-Initiated Contacts, 46(4) Brit. J. Pol. Sci. 785 (2016); M. Baekgaard et al.,
The Role of Evidence in Politics: Motivated Reasoning and Persuasion Among Politicians, Brit. J. Pol. Sci.
(2017), https://doi-org.ucc.idm.oclc.org/10.1017/S0007123417000084.
2 The Art. 29 Working Party did not, e.g. issue an Opinion or Recommendation specifically focusing
on this issue in over twenty years of operation. Academic legal commentary on this issue was also
sparse.
Analytica revelations placed the spotlight firmly on the processing of personal data
by political parties/political campaigners.3 It became clear that both the nature of
personal data being collected and its sources had undergone a radical transforma-
tion, in particular as a result of the growing use of social media and online
advertising for political purposes.
The risks associated with the move away from more traditional approaches to
the processing of personal data by political parties have been well documented.4
The European Data Protection Board (EDPB) has, for example, warned that the
extension to usage for political purposes of certain data processing techniques
‘poses serious risks, not only to the rights to privacy and to data protection, but
also to trust in the integrity of the democratic process’.5 Problematic techniques
identified include the use of predictive tools to classify or profile people’s person-
ality traits, characteristics, mood and other points of leverage ‘in order to allow
assumptions to be made about deep personality traits, including political views and
other special categories of data’.6
Against this backdrop, the strengthening of data protection law with the entry
into force in May 2018 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)7 has
significant implications for political parties. The operation of the GDPR in this
context must be considered alongside the fundamental rights protected by the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFEU).8 The fundamental rights to
respect for private life9 and data protection10 are clearly relevant to the processing
of personal data by political parties. The protection of these rights must however
be weighed against the need to protect other rights that are relevant to the
activities of political parties, principally the right to freedom of expression and
information11 and the right to vote and stand as a candidate.12
3 Practices revealed included the use of personal data obtained from social media sites, data brokers and
publicly available information sources to micro-target individual voters with messages in keeping with
their particular interests and values: see European Data Protection Supervisor, Opinion 3/2018 EDPS
Opinion on Online Manipulation and Personal Data 11–12 (19 Mar. 2018).
4 C. Bennett, Trends in Voter Surveillance in Western Societies: Privacy Intrusions and Democratic Implications,
13(3/4) Surveillance & Soc’y 370 (2015); I. Rubinstein, Voter Privacy in the Age of Big Data, Wis. L.
Rev. 861 (2014); F. Zuiderveen Borgesius et al., Online Political Microtargeting: Promises and Threats for
Democracy, 14(1) Utrecht L. Rev. 83 (2018).
5 EDPB, Statement 2/2019 on the Use of Personal Data in the Course of Political Campaigns 1 (Mar. 2019).
6 Ibid.
7 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC, [2016] OJ L
119/1.
8 [2012] OJ C 326/391; see M. Mostert et al., Big Data in Medical Research and EU Data Protection Law:
Challenges to the Consent or Anonymise Approach, 24(7) Eur. J. Hum. Genetics 956–960, 957 (2016).
9 CFEU, Art. 7.
10 CFEU, Art. 8.
11 CFEU, Art. 11.
12 CFEU, Art. 39 protects the right to vote and stand as a candidate at elections to the European
Parliament.
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This article will focus on one aspect of the GDPR, the conditions for the
lawful processing of personal data, including special categories of personal data.13 It
will consider the bases for the processing of such data by political parties14 under
the GDPR and will identify the extensive flexibilities afforded by the GDPR to
Member States in setting the rules by means of national legislation. Then, using
Ireland as a detailed case study and referencing the equivalent provisions of the UK
Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA UK) for comparison, the article will examine the
rules introduced at domestic level for the processing of personal data by political
parties. This will facilitate an analysis of the broader implications of the flexibility
afforded by the GDPR to Member States.
2 PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA BY POLITICAL PARTIES
Although political parties process personal data in a wide range of circumstances,
the two main activities giving rise to such processing are: constituency work and
political campaigning.15
Politicians may engage with the personal data of constituents when under-
taking constituency work.16 They may, for example, make representations to
public or to private bodies on behalf of a constituent, often at the request of that
constituent or of their family members.17 Such data can include sensitive personal
data, for example health data.18
In the course of political campaigning, political parties may engage in a range
of activities which generally have as their starting point the collection of personal
data about potential voters.19 The collection of personal data may be undertaken
13 The special categories of personal data are: personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, genetic data, biometric data
processed for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person and data concerning health or data
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation: Art. 9(1).
14 The term ‘political party’ is not defined in the GDPR and as will be seen in the discussion of the Irish
position, relevant legislation may extend to elected representatives and/or candidates for election and
to political campaigners who are not affiliated to a political party.
15 B. Shiner, Big Data, Small Law: How Gaps in Regulation Are Affecting Political Campaigning Methods and
the Need for Fundamental Reform, Pub. L. 362–379, 367 (2019).
16 The nature and degree of constituency work varies across different states and in accordance with
differences in the way politicians perceive and present themselves: see e.g. B. Cain, J. Ferejohn & M.
Fiorina, The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence (Cambridge MA: Harvard
University Press 1987); Parliamentary Roles in Modern Legislatures (M. Blomgren & O. Rozenberg eds,
Abingdon: Routledge 2012).
17 Data Protection Commission of Ireland, Guidelines on the Processing of Personal Data by Elected
Representatives Under Section 40 of the Data Protection Act 2018, at 2, https://www.dataprotection.ie/
sites/default/files/uploads/2018-12/Section40Guidelines.pdf.
18 Ibid., at 1.
19 Data Protection Commission of Ireland, Elected Representatives, the General Data Protection Regulation and
the Data Protection Act 2018, at 2, https://www.dataprotection.ie/sites/default/files/uploads/2018-12/
Introduction.pdf.
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directly or indirectly. Direct collection of personal data from data subjects can
come about in a traditional fashion, for example through the compilation of
mailing lists of attendees at political meetings or, in the online environment,
when for example visitors to a party website are invited to supply data through
forms or portals.20 Personal data can be indirectly collected by political parties
when it is collected from public sources such as the electoral register21 or when it is
obtained from data brokers.22
Personal data can be used by political parties to communicate with potential
voters for political marketing purposes. Parties can also use personal data to assist
them in formulating and refining their policies in order to maximize their appeal to
voters. Political parties increasingly engage in the commissioning of analysis by
third parties of the personal data of potential voters.23 Campaign data analysts
develop models using this data to ‘produce individual-level predictions about
citizens’ likelihoods of performing certain political behaviours, of supporting
candidates and issues, and of changing their support conditional on being targeted
with specific campaign interventions’.24
2.1 POLITICAL PARTIES AND THE GDPR REQUIREMENTS
Amongst the core provisions of the GDPR are the data protection principles
which are set out in Article 5 of the GDPR, the first of which requires that
personal data be processed lawfully, fairly and in a transparent manner.25 Building
on this requirement, Article 6(1) provides that processing of personal data will only
be lawful if and to the extent that at least one of a list of conditions set out in
Article 6 applies. Political parties, in common with other data controllers,26 must
therefore be able to identify at least one condition in Article 6(1) that provides the
20 Data Protection Commission of Ireland, Constituency Office – Best Practice in the Workplace, at 6, https://
www.dataprotection.ie/sites/default/files/uploads/2018-12/Office%20Practices.pdf.
21 P. Howard & D. Kreiss, Political Parties and Voter Privacy: Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the
United States in Comparative Perspective, 15(12) First Monday 2 (2010), https://firstmonday.org/article/
view/2975/2627.
22 UK Information Commissioner, Democracy Disrupted?: Personal Information and Political Influence 50 (July
2018).
23 See D. Kreiss, Prototype Politics: Technology Intensive Campaigning and the Data of Democracy (New York:
OUP 2016).
24 D. Nickerson & T. Rogers, Political Campaigns and Big Data, Harvard Kennedy School, Faculty
Research Working Paper Series, RWP13-045 (Revised Feb. 2014).
25 Article 5(1)(a).
26 A ‘data controller’ is defined as ‘the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body
which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes and means of the processing of personal
data here: Art. 4(7).
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basis for the processing by them of personal data. Where the personal data in
question belongs to a ‘special category’27 of personal data, the processing of such
data is prohibited by Article 9 of the GDPR unless at least one of the exceptions
provided for in that article applies. For special categories of data, meeting the
requirements of Article 9 is not necessarily sufficient to ensure lawfulness under
Article 6. The Article 29 Working Party (A29WP)28 has indicated that analysis has
to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis as to whether Article 9 ‘in itself provides
for stricter and sufficient conditions, or whether a cumulative application of both
Articles [6] and [9] is required to ensure full protection of data subjects’.29
Before examining the application of Articles 6 and 9 to political parties in
more detail, it should be noted that establishing the lawfulness of the processing of
personal data by political parties is not sufficient to fulfil the obligations imposed by
the GDPR on political parties. As emphasized by the EDPB:
Even where the processing is lawful, organisations need to observe their other duties
pursuant to the GDPR, including the duty to be transparent and provide sufficient
information to the individuals who are being analysed and whose personal data are
being processed, whether data has been obtained directly or indirectly.30
Thus in addition to demonstrating compliance with the data protection principles,
political parties must deliver upon the other rights conferred on data subjects by
the GDPR such as the rights of transparency,31 access,32 rectification33 and
erasure,34 the right to data portability,35 the right to object,36 and the right not
to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing.37
27 The special categories of personal data are: personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, or trade union membership, genetic data, biometric data
processed for the purpose of uniquely identifying a natural person and data concerning health or data
concerning a natural person’s sex life or sexual orientation: Art. 9(1).
28 The Art. 29 Working Party on Data Protection was established under DPD Art. 29 to play an advisory
role in respect of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data. Since the
coming into force of the GDPR (on 25 May 2018), it has been replaced by the European Data
Protection Board.
29 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 06/2014 on the Notion of Legitimate Interests of the
Data Controller Under Article 7 of Directive 95/46/EC, European Commission 15 (9 Apr. 2014). The
articles referenced in Opinion 06/2014 are Arts 7 and 8 of the Data Protection Directive which are the
forerunners of Arts 6 and 9 respectively of the GDPR.
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2.2 LAWFUL PROCESSING OF PERSONAL DATA: ARTICLE 6
Article 6 provides a list of lawful processing conditions, at least one of which must
be satisfied. The most relevant of these in the context of political parties are: that
the data subject has given consent to the processing of his or her personal data for
one or more specific purposes38; that processing is necessary for the performance of
a task carried out in the public interest39; and that processing is necessary for the
purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party.40
2.2[a] Consent
The GDPR defines consent as ‘any freely given, specific, informed and unambig-
uous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by statement or by
a clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data
relating to him or her’.41 The A29WP Guidelines on Consent (‘A29WP Consent
Guidelines’) notes that if the data subject has no real choice as to whether to
consent, feels compelled to consent, or will endure negative consequences if they
do not consent, then consent will not be valid.42 The data subject must have the
right to withdraw consent to processing at any time and it must be as easy to
withdraw as to give consent.43 The A29WP Consent Guidelines set out the
minimum amount of information which should be provided to ensure that consent
to data processing is informed. This consists of: the data controller’s name (and
those of any parties to whom the data will be transferred); the purpose of each of
the processing operations for which the consent is sought; what (type of) data will
be collected and used; the existence of the right to withdraw consent; information
about the use of data for automated decision-making (where relevant); and the
possible risks of data transfers due to absence of an adequacy decision or of
appropriate safeguards.44 Other information may also be required, with the core
question being whether the information provided is sufficient in order to ‘allow
the data subject to genuinely understand the processing operations at hand’.45
38 Article 6(1)(a). The conditions for the granting of consent are set out in Art. 7.
39 Article 6(1)(e).
40 Article 6(1)(f).
41 GDPR, Art. 4(11). In assessing whether consent is freely given, ‘utmost account’ must be taken of
whether the performance of a contract is made conditional on consent to data processing: see M.
Donnelly & M. McDonagh, Health Research, Consent and the GDPR Exemption, 26 Eur. J. Health L.
97, 101–107 (2019).
42 Guidelines on Consent Under Regulation 2016/679, adopted on 28 Nov. 2017, rev’d and adopted 10
Apr. 2018, WP257 rev.01, 5.
43 Article 7(3).
44 Guidelines on Consent Under Regulation 2016/679, supra n. 42.
45 WP29 Consent Guidelines at 13.
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Where data is collected directly from a data subject, consent to its processing
can be obtained from the individual data subject, for example through asking him
or her to tick a box granting the political party permission to use the data subject’s
contact details to advise him or her of party meetings, events and fundraising
activities. Where data is collected indirectly, political parties need to ensure that the
appropriate consent has been obtained from the individuals concerned at the point
of collection. In the case of both direct and indirect collection of personal data,
political parties must ensure that individuals are informed in line with transparency
requirements under the GDPR.46
Relying on consent as the basis for the processing of personal data can be
problematic for political parties because of the effort involved in ensuring that the
requirements for informed consent are met. This problem is exacerbated by the
nature of the processing of personal data in an era of Big Data analytics,47 which
means that even where they are positively disposed to meet their transparency
obligations, data controllers, including political parties, often lack knowledge at the
point of collection of the use to which the data being collected may be put.48 As a
result, it is unlikely that compliance with the consent requirement will often
provide the basis for lawful processing by political parties.
2.2[b] Article 6(1)(e): Processing in the Public Interest
Personal data can be processed where it is ‘necessary for the performance of a task
carried out in the public interest’. The requirement that the processing be ‘neces-
sary’ means that it must be genuinely necessary as opposed to being unilaterally
imposed on the data subject by the controller.49 An important threshold require-
ment for the invocation of Article 6(1)(e) is that the basis for the processing of
personal data in the public interest must be laid down by EU or Member State law
to which the data controller is subject.50 The law must also meet an objective of
public interest and be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.51 Member
46 See Arts 12–14. See also Art. 29 Working Party, Guidelines on transparency under Regulation 2016/
679 adopted on 29 Nov. 2017, rev’d and adopted 11 Apr. 2018, WP260, rev.01.
47 M. Paterson & M. McDonagh, Data Protection in an Era of Big Data: The Challenges Posed by Big Personal
Data, 44(1) Monash U. L. Rev. 1 (2018).
48 D. Solove, Introduction: Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1880,
1902 (2013); A. Mantelero, The Future of Consumer Data Protection in the EU: Re-thinking the ‘Notice and
Consent’ Paradigm in the New Era of Predictive Analytics, 30 Computer L. & Sec. Rev. 643, 645 (2014);
F. Cate & V. Mayer-Schönberger, Notice and Consent in a World of Big Data, 3 Int’l Data Privacy L. 67,
67–68 (2013); UK Information Commissioner, supra n. 22.
49 See the discussion of ‘necessary’ in A29WP Opinion 06/2014 on the notion of legitimate interests of
the data controller under Art. 7 of Directive 95/46/EC, European Commission 16 (9 Apr. 2014).
50 Article 6(3)(1).
51 Article 6(3)(2).
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States may introduce more specific provisions to ‘adapt the application of the rules’
set out in Article 6(1)(e) by ‘determining more precisely specific requirements for
the processing and other measures to ensure lawful and fair processing’.52 In
particular, the legal basis for the processing of personal data under section 6(1)(e)
may contain more specific provisions in respect of: general conditions governing
the lawfulness of processing by the controller; the types of data which are subject to
the processing; the data subjects concerned; the entities to, and the purposes for
which, the personal data may be disclosed; the purpose limitation; storage periods;
and processing operations and processing procedures, including measures to ensure
lawful and fair processing.53 It is suggested that the adaptation of the rules
envisaged by Article 6(3)(2) does not contemplate a weakening of GDPR rules
by the Member States but rather the more detailed specification of such rules, in
particular where Member States have ‘sector-specific laws in areas that need more
specific provisions’.54
Although not explicitly stated in the text of the GDPR, it appears that Article
6(1)(e) can be used as the basis for the processing of personal data by political parties.
This is supported by recital 45 which states that it should ‘be for Union or Member
State law to determine whether a controller performing a task carried out in the public
interest should be a public authority or another natural or legal person governed by
public law’. Since political parties are governed by public law (in the form of electoral
law), they fall into the category of bodies referred to in recital 45. The processing of
personal data by political parties can be said to be in the public interest on the grounds
that freedom of political expression on the part of political parties results in a well-
informed electorate who can more effectively exercise their franchise55 and the
existence of an informed and knowledgeable citizenry is one of the most important
requirements for the functioning of representative democracy in that it helps to
structure the participation and competition that characterizes democracies.56
The applicability of Article 6(1)(e) to the processing of personal data by
political parties and candidates is supported by the European Commission which,
in a report on the application of EU data protection law in the electoral context,
stated that ‘[p]olitical parties and foundations can also process data on the grounds




55 T. Besley & R. Burgess, The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from
India, 117(4) Q. J. Econ. 1415 (2002); R. Pande, Can Informed Voters Enforce Better Governance?
Experiments in Low-Income Democracies, 3 Ann. Rev. Econ. 215–237 (2011).
56 G. Rawnsley, Political Communication and Democracy 15 (Palgrave MacMillan 2005).
57 European Commission, Free and Fair Elections: Guidance on the Application of Union Data Protection Law
in the Electoral Context, COM(2018) 638 final at 5.
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basis for the processing of personal data by political parties has the advantage from
the political parties’ point of view of providing a clear legal basis for the processing
by them of personal data. It does, however, raise the question of how Member
States determine ‘public interest’ in the political sphere. Ultimately, the GDPR
leaves the determination of public interest to the discretion of Member States,
which leaves open the possibility of manipulation to suit the agendas of the
political parties in power in those Member States.
2.2[c] Article 6(1)(f): Processing Necessary for the Purposes of the Legitimate Interests of the
Controller or a Third Party
Article 6(1)(f) permits the processing of personal data necessary for the purposes of
the legitimate interests pursued by the controller or by a third party. It includes the
important proviso that processing on the basis of this condition may not be
undertaken where ‘such interests are overridden by the interests or fundamental
rights and freedoms of the data subject’. Recital 47 states that the existence of a
legitimate interest needs careful assessment, including whether a data subject can
reasonably expect, at the time and in the context of the collection of the personal
data, that processing for that purpose may take place.
The application of the legitimate interests condition calls for a balancing test in
which the legitimate interests of the controller (or third parties) must be balanced
against the interests or fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.58 The
A29WP states that in carrying out the balancing test, account must be taken of the
nature and source of the legitimate interests and of the impact of the processing on
the data subjects. Factors relevant to assessing the nature and source of the
legitimate interests identified by the A29WP include: whether the exercise of
any fundamental rights are at stake; the public interest or the interest of the
wider community; whether any other legitimate interests are at stake; and the
extent of legal and cultural/societal recognition of the legitimacy of the interests.59
In terms of the impact on the data subject, the relevant factors are: the range of
both positive and negative consequences of the processing; the nature of the data60;
the way the data are being processed; the reasonable expectations of the data
subject; and the status of the data controller and data subject.61 The fundamental
rights of which account must be taken are those provided for in the CFEU. The
A29WP specifically references the need to balance the rights to privacy and to
58 A29WP, supra n. 49, at 23.
59 Ibid., at 34–36.
60 The more sensitive the data, the more it will weigh the balance in favour of the data subject’s interests:
A29WP, supra n. 49, at 39.
61 Ibid., at 37–40.
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protection of personal data against other rights including the right to freedom of
expression and information.62
Balancing the data controller’s legitimate interests against the interests and
fundamental rights of data subjects requires careful assessment which must take into
account the circumstances of the specific case. It also requires the undertaking of a
proportionality analysis as provided for under Article 52(1) of the CFEU.63 The
A29WP cites the use by a candidate of the electoral register to send each potential
voter in her election district an introduction letter promoting her campaign as an
example of the exercise of the right to freedom of expression which renders the
processing of personal data legitimate under Article 6(1)(f).64 The use of the
register for such a purpose was viewed by the A29WP as coming within the
reasonable expectation of individuals, provided that it takes place in the pre-
election period. In such circumstances, the interest of the controller was said to
be clear and legitimate. The ‘limited and focused use of the information’ was
viewed by the A29WP as tipping the balance in favour of the legitimate interest of
the controller.
On the other hand, the collection and use of personal data to micro-target
voters through sending messages in a manner that permits a political party to
‘misleadingly, present itself as a one-issue party to different individuals’65 could
be viewed as not being justified on the basis of the legitimate interests of the
political party. Thus, while it appears that the legitimate interests of a political party
could well be invoked as the basis for the lawful processing of personal data by the
political party, the balancing exercise and the proportionality analysis required
make the operation of this basis both uncertain and potentially onerous.
2.3 PROCESSING OF SPECIAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONAL DATA: ARTICLE 9
Article 9(1) prohibits the processing of ‘special’ categories of personal data (which
includes data in respect of political opinions66) unless one of the exemptions in
Article 9(2) applies. The most relevant exemptions in respect of political parties
are: that the data subject has given explicit consent to the processing of his or her
personal data for one or more specific purposes67; that processing is carried out in
the course of its legitimate activities by a not-for-profit body with a political,
62 Ibid., at 34.
63 CFEU, Art. 52(1). On the relationship between Art. 6(1)(f) GDPR and Art. 52(1) CFEU see D.
Clifford & J. Ausloos, Data Protection and the Role of Fairness, 37 Y.B. Eur. L. 110 (2018).
64 A29WP, supra n. 49, at 60.
65 Borgesius et al., supra n. 4, at 82.
66 For full list, see supra n. 13.
67 Article 9(2)(a). The conditions for the granting of consent are set out in Art. 7.
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philosophical, religious or trade union aim68; and that processing is necessary for
reasons of substantial public interest.69
2.3[a] Explicit Consent: Article 9(2)(a)
The A29WP Consent Guidelines state that the term ‘explicit’ refers to the way
consent is expressed by the data subject and requires that the data subject have
given an express statement of consent.70 The same informational requirements for
informed consent apply in relation to the giving of explicit consent as are outlined
in the A29WP Consent Guidelines concerning consent to the processing of
personal data under Article 6(1)(a).71 The use of a written statement of consent
signed by the data subject is described by the A29WP as removing all possible
doubt as to whether consent was explicit. Obtaining explicit consent by means of a
telephone conversation is also identified by the A29WP as acceptable, provided
that ‘the information about the choice is fair, intelligible and clear, and it asks for a
specific confirmation from the data subject (e.g. pressing a button or providing oral
confirmation)’. Acceptable indicators of explicit consent in the online context
referred to by the A29WP include: the filling in an electronic form, the sending
of an email, the uploading of a scanned document carrying the signature of the data
subject and the use of an electronic signature.72
Having to rely on explicit consent as the basis for the processing of personal
data would be likely to be viewed as especially demanding by political parties. Not
only would the issue of meeting the requirements for informed consent and
transparency arise but the standard required in establishing explicit consent
would be significantly greater than that for consent simplicities. Thus, consent is
even less likely to be the basis for political parties’ processing of special categories of
data.
2.3[b] Processing by a Not-for-Profit Body with a Political Aim: Article 9(2)(d)
The exemption in Article 9(2)(d) applies where the processing of special categories
of data is carried out:
in the course of its legitimate activities with appropriate safeguards by a foundation,
association or any other not-for-profit body with a political, philosophical, religious or
trade union aim and on condition that the processing relates solely to the members or to
68 Article 9(2)(d).
69 Article 9(2)(g).
70 A29WP Consent Guidelines, at 18.
71 Ibid., at 13.
72 Ibid., at 18–19.
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former members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in connection
with its purposes and that the personal data are not disclosed outside that body without the
consent of the data subjects.
Assuming that political parties qualify as not-for-profit bodies with a political aim,
this provision can be summarized as permitting the processing by political parties of
special categories of personal data subject to the following conditions:
(1) that the processing be undertaken by political parties in the course of
their legitimate activities and with appropriate safeguards;
(2) that the processing relates solely to members or former members of the
political party or to persons who have regular contact with it in
connection with its purposes;
(3) that the personal data may not be disclosed outside the political party
without the consent of the data subjects.
It is notable that Article 9(2)(d) is not limited to the processing of personal data
revealing political opinions but rather it applies to the processing by such bodies of
any of the special categories of data. Thus, provided that the conditions referred to
in exception 9(2)(d) are fulfilled, it could be used as the basis for processing by a
political party of data relating to an individual’s racial origin, for example.
In order to avail of the Article 9(2)(d) exemption, the processing must be
undertaken in the course of the processor’s ‘legitimate activities’, a term which is
not defined. The level of ‘appropriate safeguards’ required to invoke exception 9
(2)(d) is also not specified, leaving it open to Member States to specify such
safeguards in national legislation.73 The personal data must relate to ‘members or
former members’ of the body in question. It cannot, for example, be used by a
political party to process data of prospective members or voters.74 The scope of the
term ‘persons who have regular contact with’ a political foundation or party ‘in
connection with its purposes’ has been explored by the French data protection
supervisory authority, the Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés
(CNIL), which has drawn a distinction between regular contact and casual contact
in this context. The CNIL has defined regular contacts as those who ‘engage with
a political party in a positive way in order to maintain regular exchanges in relation
to the party’s political action’. The CNIL has listed the following as coming within
the scope of regular contacts for the purposes of Article 9(2)(d): those who follow
someone on Twitter or become ‘friends’ on Facebook and, more generally, people
who, through social networks, have clearly manifested their willingness to
73 European Digital Rights (EDRi), Proceed with Caution: Flexibilities in the General Data Protection
Regulation 10 (5 July 2016).
74 European Commission, supra n. 57, at 6.
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maintain regular contact with the party policy or candidate. On the other hand,
according to CNIL, those who merely ‘like’, comment, share or ‘retweet’ content
posted on social networks must be considered to be casual rather than regular
contacts.75
While Article 9(2)(d) provides a useful basis for the processing of special
category personal data by political parties, it is limited in some respects. In
particular, it restricts political parties to processing personal data of members,
former members, or persons who have regular contact with it. Furthermore
political parties are not allowed to disclose data processed under Article 9(2)(d)
to third parties, such as analytics companies: it can only be disclosed within the
political party or foundation.76
2.3[c] Processing Necessary for Reasons of Substantial Public Interest: Article 9(2)(g)
The exemption set out in Article 9(2)(g), which applies where ‘processing is
necessary for reasons of substantial public interest on the basis of Union or
Member State law’,77 is, like its counterpart in Article 6, reliant on EU or national
law to provide the basis for such processing. The relevant law must be propor-
tionate to the aim pursued, it must respect the essence of the right to data
protection, and it must provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard
the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject.78 In contrast to Article
6(1)(e), Article 9(2)(g) does not provide for the introduction by Member States of
more specific provisions to ‘adapt the application of the rules’ set out in that article.
The requirement that the public interest be ‘substantial’ clearly sets a higher
threshold for the application of exception in Article 9(2)(g) than is required by
Article 6(1)(e) thereby rendering it more difficult to use this provision as the basis
for the processing of special categories of personal data for electoral purposes.
Further detail on this exemption is provided by recital 56. This recital supports
the processing by political parties of personal data on political opinions on the basis
that ‘the operation of the democratic system in a Member State requires that
political parties compile’ such data. The processing must be ‘in the course of
75 Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et Libertés (CNIL), ‘Elections 2016/2017: quelles règles doivent
respecter les candidats et partis? 18 (2016), https://www.cnil.fr/fr/elections-2016-2017-quelles-regles-
doivent-respecter-les-candidats-et-partis as cited in C. Bennett, Political Opinions, Political Affiliations,
Political Behavior and Political Inferences: The Protection of Privacy in the Data-Driven Election. See also C.
Bennett, Voter Databases, Micro-Targeting, and Data Protection Law: Can Political Parties Campaign in
Europe as They Do in North America?, 6(4) Int’l Data Privacy L. 261 (2016).
76 European Commission, supra n. 57, at 5.
77 And provided that certain conditions are met viz that the law is proportionate to the aim pursued,
respects the essence of the right to data protection and provides for suitable and specific measures to
safeguard the fundamental rights and the interests of the data subject.
78 Article 9(2)(g).
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electoral activities’ and ‘appropriate safeguards’ must be in place. There is no
definition in the GDPR of either term. The European Commission has acknowl-
edged that political parties can process special categories of data on the basis of
Union or Member State law if there is substantial public interest and provided that
appropriate safeguards are in place.79 The exemption together with recital 56 has
been described as legitimizing ‘the UK practice of political parties compiling
regional and wider databases on the political allegiances of all households, without
the consent of the data subjects’80 though it is clear that this is only possible under
Article 9(2)(g) where such practices are permitted by law. As in the case of Article
6(1)(e), the use of this basis for the processing of personal data by political parties
has the advantage from the parties’ point of view of providing a clear legal basis for
the processing by them of personal data.
3 APPLYING THE GDPR TO POLITICAL PARTIES: MEMBER
STATES RESPONSES
Although introduced as a directly effective Regulation with the stated goal of
harmonizing the data protection laws of the Member States, the GDPR contains a
number of so-called ‘flexibility’ provisions that allow the Member States to set the
rules in various contexts by means of national legislation.81
Where Member States seek to facilitate the processing of personal data by
political parties on the basis that it is necessary for the performance of a task carried
out in the public interest under Article 6(1)(e) or to facilitate the processing of
special categories of personal data on the basis that it necessary for reasons of
substantial public interest under Article 9(2) (g), the basis for such processing must
be laid down in national legislation. The GDPR also implicitly requires domestic
legislation to be introduced specifying the nature of the appropriate safeguards to
be put in place for the processing by political parties of special categories of
personal data on the basis of the legitimate interests of the political party under
Article 9(2)(d).
3.1 PERMITTED FLEXIBILITIES: THE POLICY CONTEXT
While permitting Member States to specify rules for the processing of personal data
in certain circumstances facilitates the taking into account of different domestic
legal imperatives, it also potentially undermines the operation of the GDPR. The
79 European Commission, supra n. 57, at 5.
80 EDRi, Flexibilities in the General Data Protection Regulation 11 (2018), https://edri.org/files/GDPR_
analysis/EDRi_analysis_gdpr_flexibilities.pdf.
81 EDRi, Proceed with Caution: Flexibilities in the General Data Protection Regulation 1 (5 July 2016).
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non-governmental organization European Digital Rights has, for example, com-
plained that in some areas the flexibilities provided for ‘are so broad as to give states
almost complete freedom to evade the normal requirements of the Regulation in
large areas’.82 In respect of political parties, concern has been expressed that
Member States may take the opportunity to avail of the permitted flexibilities in
a manner that, deliberately or otherwise, erodes the protection afforded by the
GDPR. Ailidh Callander has, for example, argued that the flexibilities in respect of
political parties have led to ‘the jarring outcome that certain national laws in this
way invites[sic] data exploitation rather than data protection’. 83 Issues concerning
the implementation of the GDPR in its application to political parties via national
legislation have been identified in several jurisdictions, including Romania,84
Spain,85 the UK86 and Ireland.87
The GDPR flexibilities may also introduce significant variations in the opera-
tion of the GDPR at national level88 thus reducing the extent to which a
harmonized approach to the processing of personal data will be achieved under
the GDPR. Such an outcome would clearly be inconsistent with the requirement
of recital 10 of the GDPR that ‘the level of protection of the rights and freedoms
of natural persons with regard to the processing of such data should be equivalent
in all Member States’. A lack of harmonization is problematic in so far as the law of
one Member State could facilitate the collection of data in cross border or online
contexts for reasons that other Member States may not agree with.89 In the context
82 Ibid., at 3.
83 A. Callandar, GDPR Loopholes Facilitate Data Exploitation by Political Parties, 3 GDPR Today (25 Mar.
2019) https://www.gdprtoday.org/gdpr-loopholes-facilitate-data-exploitation-by-political-parties/.
84 Valentina Pavel, European Commission Urged to Investigate Romanian GDPR Implementation, 3 GDPR
Today (25 Mar. 2019), https://www.gdprtoday.org/european-commission-urged-to-investigate-roma
nian-gdpr-implementation/.
85 Access Now, MEP Sophie In’t Veld Sent Letter to EDPB and Commission on Questionable Spanish
Implementation of the GDPR, GDPR Today (17 Dec. 2018), https://www.gdprtoday.org/mep-
sophie-int-veld-sent-letter-to-edpb-and-commission-on-questionable-spanish-implementation-of-
the-gdpr/; Open Rights Group, Spain: DPA Limits the Use of Data in Political Campaigning, 3 GDPR
Today (25 Mar. 2019), https://www.gdprtoday.org/spain-dpa-limits-the-use-of-data-in-political-cam
paigning/.
86 The Independent, UK Parties Poised to Gain Data Powers to Work Out How People Are Likely to Vote,
Despite Cambridge Analytica Scandal (22 Mar. 2018); Open Rights, The Missing Piece from the DCMS
Report? Themselves, https://www.openrightsgroup.org/blog/2019/the-missing-piece-from-the-dcms-
report-themselves; GDPR Today, GDPR Loopholes Facilitate Data Exploitation by Political Parties,
https://www.gdprtoday.org/gdpr-loopholes-facilitate-data-exploitation-by-political-parties/; Privacy
international, UK Data Protection Act 2018 – 339 Pages Still Falls Short on Human Rights Protection (13
June 2018), https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/2074/uk-data-protection-act-2018-339-
pages-still-falls-short-human-rights-protection.
87 Irish Times New Bill Will Allow Harvesting of Personal Data for Elections, Experts Say (19 Mar. 2018).
88 Ibid.
89 EDRi, supra n. 81, at 11.
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of political parties, these differences are not just inconveniences but may directly
impact on the operation of democratic processes in Member States.
Because of the level of flexibility permitted, a full understanding of the
implications of the GDPR requires a close analysis of how individual Member
States are availing of the permitted flexibilities. The approach adopted by the Irish
Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA) is analysed below. As the location of the
European headquarters of a number of the most globally significant social media
companies, including Facebook, Twitter and Google the approach taken in Ireland
could also potentially have ramifications for the processing of personal data by
political parties in other jurisdictions. The analysis is presented against a backdrop
of the broader Irish political context. Comparisons are made with the UK Data
Protection Act 2018. This permits some broader conclusions to be drawn regard-
ing the impact of the GDPR flexibilities.
3.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GDPR’S PROVISIONS CONCERNING POLITICAL
PARTIES IN IRELAND
The Irish legislature has long favoured a light touch towards the processing of data
personal data for the purpose of electoral activities. This was evident in the
transposition of the Data Protection Directive into Irish law90 and a similar
approach has been adopted in relation to the GDPR. It is worth pausing briefly
to reflect on Irish political culture and why it might affect the willingness of the
Irish legislature to fully embrace the protection of personal data in the electoral
context.
3.2[a] Background to the Irish Approach
Michael Marsh has identified ‘extensive door-to door canvassing by party workers
and the candidates themselves’ as a key feature of Irish politics.91 The importance
of this style of campaigning can be attributed to the significance of ‘localism’ in
Irish politics92 and in particular to the widely accepted view that the Irish electoral
90 See e.g. the inclusion in the Data Protection Acts 1988–2003 of a lawful basis for the processing of data
carried out by political parties in the course of electoral activities although no specific provision for
processing of personal data on this ground had been provided for in Directive 95/46/EC: s. 2B(1)(x).
91 M. Marsh et al., The Irish Voter: The Nature of Electoral Competition in the Republic of Ireland 5
(Manchester: Manchester University Press 2008); M. Marsh, None of That Post-modern Stuff Around
Here: Grassroots Campaigning in the 2002 Irish General Election, 14 Brit. Elec. & Party Rev. 245, 246
(2004).
92 M. Gallagher, Candidate Selection in Ireland: The Impact of Localism and the Electoral System, 10(4) Brit. J.
Pol. Sci. 489, 491 (1980).
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system is highly constituency oriented.93 The emphasis on constituency is most
commonly explained as being a consequence of Ireland’s ‘highly distinctive’94
electoral system which consists of proportional representation based on a single
transferable vote. A key feature of this system is that it involves multi-seat
constituencies. This results in candidates in Irish elections facing ‘significant pres-
sure to distinguish themselves from their party colleagues, as in most constituencies
several candidates face opponents from within their own party’.95 One avenue
open to candidates in terms of distinguishing themselves from competitors is to be
seen to serve their constituents in a ‘welfare-officer role’ for individual constituents
and/or as a promoter of the collective needs of their constituents.96 Other reasons
for strong constituency orientation of the Irish electoral system include: the small
size of Irish society, inadequate parliamentary resources and procedures, problems
in the administrative system and the weakness of local government.97
The strong emphasis placed by the Irish electoral system on serving the needs
of constituents renders the collection of data concerning those constituents and
their concerns essential in the eyes of candidates for elected office. The perceived
importance of the processing of personal data for the purpose of electoral activities
is borne out by the Oireachtas (parliamentary) debate concerning the lawful
processing exception for data revealing political opinion in the Data Protection
Bill 2018. The Minister responsible for promoting the Bill referred to the proces-
sing of data for electoral activities as allowing ‘elected representatives and candi-
dates for elective office to reflect the concerns, anxieties and priorities of the
citizens of the State, that is, the electorate’.98 Another contributor to the debate
sought reassurance that campaigners would continue to be allowed to process
personal data gleaned from registers about ‘what people thought, what they did
not think and whether they were going to vote’ for broad purposes, rather than
merely for electoral purposes.99 This reflects a concern evident throughout the
parliamentary debates that the GDPR should not impinge on the ability of Irish
political parties and elected representatives to engage with their constituents not
93 R. Katz, The Single Transferable Vote and Proportional Representation, in Choosing an Electoral System: Issues
and Alternatives 143 (A. Lijphart & B. Grofman eds, New York: Praeger 1984); R. Carty, Party and
Parish Pump: Electoral Politics in Ireland 134 (1981), in Politics in the Republic of Ireland 103 (J. Coakley &
M. Gallagher eds, 6th ed., Abindgon, Routledge 2018).
94 D. Farrell & R. Sinnott, The Electoral System, in Ibid., Ch. 5, at 105.
95 M. Sudulich & M. Wall, Keeping Up with the Murphys? Candidate Cyber-Campaigning in the 2007 Irish
General Election, 62(3) Parliamentary Aff. 456–475, 459 (2009).
96 M. Gallagher & L. Komito, The Constituency Role of Dáil Deputies, in Ibid., Ch. 8, at 191.
97 Farrell & Sinnott, supra n. 94, at 105.
98 Deputy Charles Flanagan, Seanad Éireann Debates, 256(13) Thursday: Data Protection Bill 2018,
Report Stage (22 Mar. 2018).
99 Senator Michael McDowell, Seanad Éireann Debates, 256(13) Thursday: Data Protection Bill 2018,
Report Stage (22 Mar. 2018).
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only at election time. As the closer analysis which follows reveals, the provisions of
the DPA that touch on the processing of personal data by political parties strongly
reflect this political concern.
3.2[b] The Processing of Personal Data by Political Parties Under the DPA
The DPA makes extensive use of the ‘flexibility’ afforded by the GDPR in terms
of the processing of personal data by political parties. Specific provision is made in
three sections of the Act (sections 39, 40 and 48) for the processing of personal data
by political parties. A ‘political party’ is defined as a political party registered in the
Register of Political Parties in accordance with section 25 of the Electoral Act
1992.100
3.2[b][i] Section 39: Communication with Data Subjects by Political Parties
Section 39(1) of the DPA permits political parties, members of the national and
European parliaments and local authorities, and candidates for election to such
bodies to use personal data in the course of their electoral activities in the State for
the purpose of communicating in writing with data subjects. There is no require-
ment that such communication be initiated by the data subject thus permitting the
sending of unsolicited communications. ‘Electoral activities’ are defined as includ-
ing ‘the dissemination of information, including information as to a person’s
activities and policies, that might reasonably be of interest to electors’.101
Notably, electoral activities are not limited by this definition to the pre-election
period. The impact of this provision is reinforced by the exclusion by the Act of
the right to object to direct marketing in the case of political parties acting in the
course of their electoral activities.102
Communication in accordance with section 39(1) is deemed to constitute ‘the
performance of a task carried out in the public interest’ for the purposes of Article
6(1)(e) of the GDPR.103 However, neither the Act nor the Explanatory
Memorandum explain what type of personal data may be processed for the purpose
of communicating with the data subject in the public interest and, in particular,
whether the permitted data use extends beyond the type of information included
in the electoral register viz names and addresses to include, for example, personal
100 DPA, s. 2(1). Under s. 25 of the Electoral Act 1992, the Clerk of the Dáil is designated the Registrar of
Political Parties. A political party may apply to the Registrar for registration as a political party if is it a
party organized in the State or in a part of the State to contest a Dáil, European or local election.
101 DPA, s. 39(4).
102 DPA, s. 58.
103 DPA, s. 39(2).
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data from social media sites. The section does not make reference to the processing
of special categories of data under Article 9 to which the higher standard of
substantial public interest applies and therefore, it is difficult to see that it covers
this kind of data. However, section 51 of the DPA creates a power under which
any Minister of the Government104 may, in consultation with other Ministers and
the Data Protection Commission, make regulations to permit the processing of
special categories of personal data for reasons of substantial public interest as
referred to in Article 9.2(g) of the GDPR. This provides scope for the expansion
of the public interest basis for the processing of special categories of personal data
by means secondary legislation alone.105
Section 39 establishes an open-ended exemption for political parties and elected
representatives based on the public interest. Notably, the section 39 exemption does
not extend to other political campaigning e.g. to referendum campaigns which play
an especially significant role in the Irish political landscape. Thus, it may impede
campaigners who are not affiliated with a political party and in this way potentially
undermines the democratic process in this context. From a privacy perspective,
section 39 also raises questions with respect to the section’s compatibility with the
ePrivacy Directive which prohibits the sending of unsolicited electronic commu-
nications such as emails and text messages without consent.106
Ireland is not the only Member State to take a liberal interpretation of the
public interest aspect of the GDPR in respect of political parties. In the UK,
although no specific provision is made in the DPA UK for the sending of
unsolicited communications by political parties, a provision was included in the
DPA UK by way of government amendment which has greatly expanded the
scope for political parties to process personal data on public interest grounds.
Section 8 of DPA UK lists forms of processing which constitute ‘processing
necessary for the performance of a task carried out in the public interest’ for the
purposes of Article 6(1)(e). This includes processing necessary for ‘an activity that
supports or promotes democratic engagement’.107 While the term ‘democratic
104 If the Minister is not the Minister for Justice and Equality, s/he must first consult with the Minister for
Equality and Justice. In all cases, there must be consultation with the Data Protection Commission:
DPA, s. 51(6).
105 A similar provision in the UK Data Protection Act (s. 10(6)) was the subject of much criticism. See
House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, Report on the Data
Protection Bill, 6th Report of Session 2017–19, HL Paper 29, 6 (24 Oct. 2017).
106 Directive 2002/58/EC, [2002] OJ L 201, 37, Art. 13. The ePrivacy Directive will shortly be replaced
by the ePrivacy Regulation. Proposal for a Regulation concerning the respect for private life and the
protection of personal data in electronic communications and repealing Directive 2002/58/EC
(Regulation on Privacy and Electronic Communications), COM/2017/010 final, 2017/03. A similar
prohibition on the sending of unsolicited communications is provided for in Art. 16 of the proposed
Regulation.
107 Section 8(e).
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engagement’ is not defined in DPA UK, examples of activities that could come
within its scope referred to by the Member of Parliament (MP) who introduced
the amendment included ‘communicating with electors, campaigning activities,
supporting candidates and elected representatives, casework, surveys and opinion
gathering and fundraising to support any of those activities’.108 Thus, this exemp-
tion is not linked to formal political parties. This aspect of the UK approach has
been severely criticized.109 Apart from criticism of the scope of activities that may
qualify as activities supporting or promoting democratic engagement, concern has
also been expressed that the provision does not place any limits on who may
undertake such processing. On the latter point, the ‘UK’ Information
Commissioner contrasted its wide scope with the treatment of the processing of
the sensitive data revealing political opinions which ‘are only able to be used by
registered political parties rather than by any data controller’.110
3.2[b][ii] Section 40: Processing of Personal Data Pursuant to Representations
Two forms of processing are provided for in section 40: the processing of personal
data by or on behalf of an elected representative pursuant to a representation made
to him or her by or on behalf of a data subject111; and the processing of personal
data by a third party in response to a representation made by an elected
representative.112
Section 40(1) purports to render lawful the processing of personal data and of
special categories of personal data by or on behalf of an elected representative (who
may or may not be a member of a political party)113 for the purpose of enabling the
representative to perform his or her functions in circumstances where the repre-
sentative receives a request or representation from the data subject or from another
person on behalf of the data subject.
Where the elected representative processes special categories of personal data,
s/he is required to impose limitations on access to that data to prevent unauthor-
ized consultation, alteration, disclosure or erasure of the data.114 However, the
nature of these limitations is not specified in the Act.
108 M. P. Margot James, Public Bill Committee, Data Protection Bill 22 (13 Mar. 2018).
109 See Privacy International, supra n. 86.
110 UK Information Commissioner, Data Protection Bill, House of Commons Public Bill
Committee – Information Commissioner’s further written evidence at 10.
111 DPA, ss 40(1)–(3).
112 DPA, s. 40(4).
113 An elected representative is defined for the purposes of s. 40 as ‘a member of the national or European
parliaments or of a local authority’: DPA, s. 40(5).
114 DPA, s. 40(3).
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Requests or representations may be made on behalf of a data subject where
the data subject has consented to the making of such a request or representation or
where ‘by reason of his or her physical or mental incapacity or age, he or she is
unable to make a request or representation’.115 The Act does not provide any
further guidance on when a data subject is unable to make the request or
representation. Elsewhere in the DPA, a ‘child’ is defined for the purposes of the
application of the GDPR in the State as a person under the age of eighteen years116
and it may be the case that a similar approach would be taken to the age-related
aspect of section 40. Physical and mental incapacity raise further questions. In a
world of telephones and digital communication, at what point does a physical
incapacity render a person unable to make a request or representation? In respect of
mental incapacity, the DPA does not identify the applicable standard to determine
whether a person is unable to make a representation. When the Assisted Decision
Making (Capacity) Act 2015 (ADMCA) comes into force in 2022, the statutory
standard for capacity set out in this Act will apply. This requires that a person’s
capacity be assessed on the basis of his or her ability to understand, at the time the
decision has to be made (in this case, the decision to make the request or
representation), the nature and consequences of the decision in the context of
the available choices at the time.117 The ADMCA also requires that decisions made
for a person who lacks capacity must be in accordance with the principles set out in
section 8. These include that the decision, in this case the request or representa-
tion, must ‘give effect, as far as practicable, to the past and present will and
preferences of the relevant person, in so far as that will and those preferences are
reasonably ascertainable’.118 The legal obligation in this respect is on the person
making the request or representation on behalf of the person lacking capacity
rather than on the elected representative to whom the request is made.
Section 40 does not place any restrictions on the categories of persons who
may make a request or representation to an elected representative on behalf of a
data subject. Clearly parents or guardians would have legal authority to make a
request on behalf of a child. For adults, it is not clear what, if any, legal basis there
is for a third party to make a representation (unless s/he has been appointed and
given powers in this regard under the Powers of Attorney Act 1996 or has been
appointed to act on behalf of a person admitted to wardship). Thus, the legal basis
115 DPA, s. 40(2).
116 DPA, s. 29.
117 ADMCA, s. 3(1). A person lacks capacity if s/he is unable to understand the information relevant to
the decision; retain the information for long enough to make a decision; use or weigh the information
as part of making the decision; or communicate his or her decision: ADMCA, s. 3(2). The ADMCA
also requires that a person ‘shall not be deemed to be unable to make a decision unless all practicable
steps’ have been taken to help him or her: ADMCA, s. 8(3).
118 ADMCA, s. 8 (7).
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for this aspect of s.40 is uncertain. This problem will continue after the ADMCA
comes into force. Under the ADMCA, the only circumstances in which a person
will be legally authorized to act on behalf of a person lacking decision-making
capacity (including making requests or representations) will be where s/he has a
power of attorney granting this power or has been appointed by the court to act as
Decision-Making Representative for the person with specific powers in this
regard.
Section 40(4) is concerned with the position under the GDPR of entities who
process personal data in response to representations made by elected representa-
tives. Section 40(4) makes it lawful for any person to disclose to an elected
representative or to a person acting on his or her behalf, personal data and special
categories of personal data of a data subject who has made a request or representa-
tion, or on whose behalf a request or representation has been made, in order to
enable that elected representative to respond to that request or representation.
Such data may only be disclosed to the extent that it is necessary and proportionate
to enable the elected representative to deal with a request or representation. The
making of such disclosures is also subject to ‘suitable and specific measures’ being
taken to safeguard the fundamental rights and freedoms of the data subject.119
In contrast to section 39, section 40 does not identify which of the lawful basis
for the processing of personal data it relies upon. While section 40(2) references
obtaining the consent of the data subject, the consent in question is consent to the
making of a representation on behalf of a data subject rather than consent to the
processing of personal data. The activities permitted by section 40 are not stated to
constitute the performance of a task carried out in the public interest for the
purposes of Article 6(1)(e) or as ‘necessary for reasons of substantial public interest’
for the purposes of Article 9(2)(g). Assuming consent is not obtained, the only
possible basis for the processing of personal data under section 40 would appear to
be that of the legitimate interests of the data controller (Article 6(1)(f)). As
identified above, this calls for a balancing test in which the legitimate interests of
the controller must be balanced against the interests or fundamental rights and
freedoms of the data subject.120 In the case of processing of personal data under
section 40(1), the legitimate interests in question are those of the elected repre-
sentative whereas under section 40(4) the legitimate interests are those of the third
party e.g. the service provider. While elected representatives have a legitimate
interest in representing their constituents and third parties such as service providers
have a legitimate interest in engaging with those who make representations on
behalf of service users, it is not clear that the interferences with the privacy and
119 See the discussion of ‘suitable and specific measures’ at text to infra n. 123.
120 See text to supra n. 57.
384 EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW
autonomy of data subjects that such processing may entail would be overridden by
the interests of the data controllers concerned. Moreover the legitimate interests of
the data controller is only available as a ground for the lawful processing of
ordinary personal data and cannot be used as the basis of the processing of special
categories of data such as data relating to health. It is not clear that the processing of
special categories of data under section 40 would meet any of the conditions for
the processing of special categories of personal data provided for in Article 9.
The DPA UK also provides for both the processing of personal data by elected
representatives and the processing of personal data by third parties resulting from
requests made by individuals to elected representatives, although there is no direct
equivalent to section 40. In the first place, provision is made in DPA UK for the
processing of special categories of personal data121 by elected representatives where
this is done in connection with the discharge of the elected representative’s
functions and in response to requests from individuals.122 The processing must
be ‘necessary for the purposes of or in connection with, the action reasonably
taken by the elected representative in response to [the] request’.123 A request may
be made to an elected representative by someone other than the data subject and
without the consent of the data subject in the following four situations: where in
the circumstances, consent to the processing cannot be given by the data subject;
where in the circumstances, the elected representative cannot reasonably be
expected to obtain the consent of the data subject to the processing; where
obtaining the consent of the data subject would prejudice the action taken by
the elected representative; and finally where the processing is necessary in the
interests of another individual and the data subject has withheld consent
unreasonably.
Secondly, provision is made in DPA UK for the disclosure of special cate-
gories of personal data by data controllers to elected representatives in circum-
stances where the elected representative communicates with the controller in
response to receiving a request from the individual.124 The personal data must
be relevant to the subject matter of the communication, and the disclosure must be
necessary for the purpose of responding to that communication.125
The scope provided by DPA UK to persons other than the data subject to
make requests to elected representatives is broader than in the Irish DPA. It is not
clear from DPA UK the circumstances in which it might be said that the consent
121 The processing by elected representatives of ordinary personal data would presumably fall within the
scope of Art. 6(1)(e) of the GDPR on the basis that it is ‘an activity that supports or promotes
democratic engagement’ as provided for in s. 8(e).
122 DPA UK, s. 10(3) and Sch. 1, Part 2, para. 23.
123 DPA UK, Sch. 1, Pt 2, para. 23(1)(b).
124 DPA UK, s. 10(3) and Sch. 1, Part 2, para. 24.
125 Ibid.
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of the data subject ‘cannot be given’ or that the elected representative ‘cannot
reasonably be expected to’ obtain consent or that the data subject can be said to
have withheld consent unreasonably. On the other hand, the statutory language of
DPA UK more closely reflects the language of the GDPR. The processing of
special categories of personal data by elected representatives is expressly designated
in DPA UK as being on ‘grounds of substantial public interest’ thus clearly bring-
ing such processing within the scope of Article 9(2)(g). In contrast, the processing
of personal data by elected representatives under section40 of DPA is not so
designated thus casting doubts on its legality. Moreover unlike the Irish measure
the requirement of necessity, which is a central feature of both Articles 6 and 9,
features prominently in DPA UK.
3.2[b][iii] Section 48: Processing of Personal Data Revealing Political Opinions
Section 48 of the Act has its origins in Article 9(2)(d) of the GDPR. It states that
subject to suitable and specific measures126 being taken to safeguard the funda-
mental rights and freedoms of data subjects, the processing of personal data
revealing political opinions127 shall be lawful where it is carried out in the course
of its electoral activities in the State for the purpose of compiling data on peoples’
political opinions by a political party, or a candidate for election to, or a holder of,
elective political office in the State.128
While section 48 to some extent mirrors Article 9(2)(d) of the GDPR, there
are some significant differences. On the one hand, the scope of section 48 is more
limited than that of Article 9(2)(d) in that the former is confined to the processing
of personal data revealing political opinions whereas Article 9(2)(d) applies in
respect of processing of any of the special categories of data. On the other hand,
the GDPR requirement that the processing ‘relates solely to the members or to
former members of the body or to persons who have regular contact with it in
connection with its purposes’ is omitted from section 48 and nor does section 48
reference the requirement of Article 9(2)(d) that the personal data must not be
disclosed outside the body processing it without the consent of the data subjects.
These omissions would appear to broaden the scope of section 48 beyond what is
permitted by Article 9(2)(d). The equivalent provision under the DPA UK also
126 See the discussion of ‘suitable and specific measures’ infra.
127 Neither the GDPR (from which the term is taken) nor the DPA provide a definition of what
constitutes a political opinion.
128 The exemption also applies to the Referendum Commission in the performance of its functions: DPA,
s. 48(b). The Referendum Commission is a statutory body established under the Referendum Act
1998 as am by the Referendum Act 2001 and has the function of explaining to the public what a
referendum proposal means; ensuring people know a referendum is being held; and, encouraging
people to vote.
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fails to limit its application to members or former members and thus also appears to
exceed the scope of the GDPR.129 However, the DPA UK contains important
protections in that it provides for exceptions to the processing of personal data
revealing political opinion where it is likely to cause substantial damage or
substantial distress to a person130 and where the data subject has given reasonable
notice in writing to the controller requiring the controller not to process the
personal data and the notice period has ended.131
3.2[b][iv] Section 36: Suitable and Specific Measures
The application of the exemptions in both section 40(4) and section 48 depend on
the taking of ‘suitable and specific measures’ to safeguard the fundamental rights
and freedoms of data subjects. Section 36(1) of the DPA sets out the measures to be
deployed in circumstances where the DPA (or any regulations made under the
DPA) requires that suitable and specific measures be taken. Such measures ‘may
include, in particular’ a set of measures listed in section 36(1) which range from the
relatively undemanding, such as the provision of specific targeted training for those
involved in processing operations, through to requiring that the explicit consent of
the data subject be obtained for the processing. Section 36(2) enables, but does not
mandate, the introduction of regulations to specify safeguarding measures addi-
tional to those provided for in section 36(1) and to specify that the adoption of any
measures is mandatory.132 Examples of additional safeguarding measures include:
measures relating to governance structures and to processes or procedures for risk
assessment purposes, and organizational measures..133
In the absence of relevant regulations being introduced under section 36(2),
the processing of personal data under section 40(4) by third parties in response to
requests or representations from elected representatives and under section 48 of
personal data revealing political opinion may be undertaken on the basis of safe-
guards as undemanding as the putting in place of training for those involved in the
processing operations. It is questionable whether this meets the requirement in
Article 9(2)(g) of the GDPR that processing of special categories of personal data
129 DPA UK, Sch. 1, Pt 2, para. 22.
130 Ibid., para. 22(2).
131 Ibid., para. 22(3).
132 In making regulations under s. 36(2), regard must be had to the public interest and to the need for the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of their personal data and to matters such as the
nature, scope, context and purposes of the processing, the risks arising for the rights and freedoms of
individuals, and the likelihood and the severity of the risks for the individuals concerned. To date the
only measure introduced is the Data Protection Act 2018 (s. 36(2)) (Health Research) Regulations
2018 (S.I. No. 314 of 2018): see further Donnelly & McDonagh, supra n. 41.
133 DPA UK, s. 36(3).
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be carried out ‘with appropriate safeguards’. An amendment to section 36 pro-
posed during the course of the parliamentary debate sought to make the adoption
of certain of the safeguards referenced in section 36 mandatory.134 In opposing this
amendment, which was ultimately defeated, the Minister responsible for the Bill
stated that it ‘would place a high burden on elected representatives making
representations on behalf of constituents’.135 The making of representations on
behalf of constituents as well as the seeking of information and services on their
behalf were referred to by the Minister as ‘part of the routine work we do’ and he
concluded by noting that ‘[w]hile it is important that there is compliance with the
legislation and the GDPR as we enter this new era, it is also important that we do
not make matters so burdensome and onerous as to become unworkable’.136 The
light touch requirements in the DPA can be contrasted with a more rigorous
approach in DPA UK. Here a, substantial public interest condition will only be
met where the controller has an appropriate policy document in place which inter
alia explains the controller’s procedures for securing compliance with the data
protection principles and as regards the controller’s policies as regards the retention
and erasure of personal data including giving an indication of how long such
personal data is likely to be retained 137 and provided that a record is made of
the processing.138
4 CONCLUSION
Given the wide range of political cultures across the EU, the task of developing
pan-EU data protection measures applicable to the operations of political parties
was inevitably going to prove challenging. The mixed messages emanating from
the GDPR with respect to the processing of personal data by political parties have
been compounded by the level of flexibility afforded by the GDPR to Member
States to set their own rules through national legislation. While respecting different
cultures and traditions, this also has the effect, to borrow from the old saying, of
leaving the fox in charge of the henhouse.
The analysis of the Irish DPA conducted in this article found that Irish
legislators have afforded themselves a good deal of latitude in processing data for
political purposes. In some situations, arguably in the case of section 39 which
allows political parties to process personal data in the course of their electoral
134 Amendment proposed by Deputy Claire Daly, Select Committee on Justice and Equality (2 May
2018).
135 Deputy Charles Flanagan, Select Committee on Justice and Equality (2 May 2018).
136 Ibid.
137 DPA UK, Sch. 1, Pt 4, para. 39.
138 Ibid., para. 41.
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activities for the purpose of communicating with data subjects, this might simply
be described as a generous interpretation of the GDPR requirements (although as
noted, this may well run into difficulties under the ePrivacy Directive/
Regulation).139 In others, however, the DPA approach to data processing by
political parties seems to directly contravene the GDPR. This is the case with
section 40 which allows for the processing of special categories of personal data in
the context of a request or representation to an elected representative without a
clear basis in the GDPR and with section 48 which fails to limit the processing of
personal data revealing political opinions for electoral activities to data that ‘relates
solely to the members or to former members of the body or to persons who have
regular contact with it in connection with its purposes’ as is required under Article
9(2)(d) of the GDPR.
It is also important to remember that domestic legislation on the processing
of personal data must also comply with the requirements of the CFEU. While
Article 52(1) of the CFEU permits the placing of limitations on the rights
protected by the CFEU, it requires that these satisfy the proportionality assess-
ment outlined in Article 52.140 It is difficult to see that the kind of wide-ranging
processing exemptions adopted in the DPA would fulfil these requirements. It is
interesting to note that the granting of powers to political parties under national
legislation to process the personal data of citizens is already under attack at
domestic level on human rights grounds: the Spanish Constitutional Court has
declared unconstitutional a provision of the Spanish Data Protection Act which
permitted political parties to collect personal data concerning the political pre-
ferences of citizens.141
In drawing broader conclusions from the discussion of the Irish approach, it is
important to remember the specifics of Irish political culture with its very strong
emphasis on local and constituency politics. The comparison with this aspect of the
DPA UK suggests a somewhat more rigorous approach, although in the UK too the
political parties are generally facilitated in what they may do and aspects of that
legislation too would seem to be inconsistent with the GDPR. A more in-depth
study of Member States is required before definitive conclusions can be reached but
in light of the UK approach and of the issues which have already been raised in some
other Member States,142 it might reasonably be presumed that many Member States
share Ireland’s liberal approach to data processing by political parties.
139 See text to supra n. 105.
140 See text to supra n. 62.
141 Constitutional Court of Spain, Office of the President, Press Release No 76/2019, https://www.
tribunalconstitucional.es/NotasDePrensaDocumentos/NP_2019_076/PressReleaseNo.76.2019.pdf.
142 See text to supra n. 83.
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While other measures have been taken to address the problems associated with
attempts to influence the outcome of elections by manipulating personal data,143
data protection law remains central to this endeavour. The importance of data
protection law in this context has been highlighted by the EDPB in the following
terms:
Compliance with data protection rules, including in the context of electoral activities and
political campaigns, is essential to protect democracy. It is also a means to preserve the trust
and confidence of citizens and the integrity of elections.144
In light of this, it is necessary to work towards striking a better balance between the
values at stake. Closer engagement with the issue of political parties by the EDPB
would seem to be an obvious place to begin. As noted in the Introduction, this
issue was neglected by the A29WP. However, in the wake of Cambridge
Analytica, it is no longer defensible to ignore the importance of data protection
in the political context. Guidance from the EDPB would provide a more nuanced
engagement with the issues at stake and thus allow for a more fine-grained
response which bridges the space between the ‘one size fits all’ approach in the
GDPR and the wide-ranging discretion of the flexibilities afforded to Member
States.
143 See e.g. the announcement by the European Council in Mar. 2019 of the adoption of rules aimed at
preventing European political parties from misusing personal data in EP elections through the
amendment of Regulation 1141/2014 on the statute and funding of European political parties and
European political foundations, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/
19/ep-elections-eu-adopts-new-rules-to-prevent-misuse-of-personal-data-by-european-political-par
ties/.
144 EDPB, supra n. 5, at 3.
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